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NOTES
PENAL AND INJUNCTIVE PROVISIONS OF
THE SECURITIES ACT
The vital human problem present in the application of penal
and injunctive laws necessitates the careful and clear draftman-
ship of such enactments. Lawyers and interested parties should
be afforded an adequate comprehension of the rights and duties
imposed by the legislation. It is the purpose of this note to pre-
sent the general penal and injunctive provisions of the Securities
Act of 1933, and to point out the significant factors which have
influenced, or which may influence, the courts in interpreting
these provisions.'
1
In the famous case of Rex v. Lord Kylsant2 the defendant was
indicted for violating the English Larceny Act of 1861 which
imposed criminal liability on a director or officer of a corporation
who
* * * shall make, circulate or publish *** any written state-
ment or account, which he shall know to be false in any
material particular * * * with intent to induce any person-
to intrust or advance any property to such body corporate
or public company. (Italics supplied).
The complaint was founded upon the circulation of certain pros-
pectuses which had been distributed for the purpose of inducing
the public to purchase a forthcoming bond issue. The prospec-
tuses were true as regards the statement of facts contained there-
in, but were very carefully worded so as to create as a whole an
erroneous impression, namely, that dividends had been paid from
the yearly earnings of the company, when in fact they had been
taken from a reserve, hidden fund. The prospectus also led the
reader to believe that the company had been continuously oper-
ating at a yearly profit, which impression was equally untrue.
The court, in interpreting the statutory phrase, "false in a mate-
rial particular," said
* * * the document as a whole may be false not because of
what it states but because of what it does not state, because
of what it implies.8
The rationale of Rex v. Kylsant was the most influential factor
1. For other treatment of this problem see MacIntyre, Criminal Provi-
slons of the Securities Act and Analogies to Similar Criminal Statutes
(1933) 43 Yale L. J. 254; Herlands, Criminal Law Aspects of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 (1933) 67 U. S. L. Rev. 562-75, 615-27.
2. (1932) 1 K. B. 442, 48 T. L. R. 62.
3. Id. at 445.
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in determining the character of legal duty to be imposed under
the Securities Act.4 Section 24, referred to in the Act as the
penalty provision, provides as follows
(1) Any person who wilfully violates any of the provisions
of this title, or the rules and regulations promulgated by the
Commission under authority thereof, or(2) Any person who wilfully, in a registration statement
filed under this title, makes any untrue statement of a mate-
rial fact or omits to state any material fact required to be
stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein
not misleading, shall upon conviction be fined not more than
$5000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
(Italics supplied.)
The requirement of wilfulness as a prerequisite to criminal
liability should afford little difficulty in application. A wilful
act may be described as one done intentionally, knowingly, or with
recklessness or gross negligence, as distinguished from an act
done carelessly or inadvertently The framers entirely rejected
the proposed provision of the Uniform Sale of Securities Act
which does not require the element of wilfulness, but provides
that only violations done "in good faith and on reasonable
grounds for believing it not to be a violation," shall be excused
from the penalty.7 It is the obvious purpose of the Securities Act
to punish only those who flagrantly disregard the provisions of
the Act.
Section. 20(b) empowers the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission to transmit such evidence as may be available concern-
ing any violations of the Act, or of any rule or regulation, to the
Attorney General, who may, in his discretion, institute the neces-
sary criminal proceedings under the Act.
Section 22 (a) provides that any of the criminal proceedings
arising under the Act may be brought in the district wherein
the defendant is found, is an inhabitant, transacts business, or
in the district in which the sale took place. In United States V.
Kopald, Quinn & Co.,8 however, the jurisdictional requirement
of this section was held to refer only to the offense of using the
mails for transmitting a prospectus or security and not to other
violations of the Act. Other violations were held to fall within
4. MacIntyre, op. cit., 256.
5. Wharton, Criminal Law (1932) 1782, see. 1511; State v. Caldwell(1909) 55 Tex. Cr. 164, 115 S. W. 597; State v. Clifton (1910) 152 N. C.
800, 67 S. E. 751, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 673.
6. Herlands, op. cit., 565.
7. 9 U. L. A. 408, sec. 17.
8. (D. C. N. D. Ga. 1937) C. C. H., Securities Act, 648, par. 4624 (.03).
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the general penalty clause of section 24, and since no special
venue had been provided other than that set out in section 22 (a)
it was decided that the venue should be determined by the gen-
eral law applicable. Under the general law it was held that a
crime may be prosecuted either in the district in which it was
commenced or in that in which it was completed.
II
The Securities & Exchange Commission is given authority to
obtain injunctive relief against anyone "who is engaged or is
about to engage in any acts or practices which will constitute a
violation of the Act or any rule or regulation."9 The element of
wilfulness necessary to effectuate criminal responsibility should
be contrasted with the fact that injunctive relief may be obtained
without establishing the wilful character of the violation. The
original bill as proposed by the President had lodged an injunc-
tive power in the Attorney General similar to that given to
the Commission.1" This relief has been denied where the im-
pending violations were not shown to be "imminent."" In Se-
curities & Exchange Comm. v. Torr12 this principle was ap-
plied to deny an injunction where it had been shown that the
defendant had clearly violated the Act, but that there was no
likelihood of a resumption of such action. In Securities & Ex-
change Comm. v. Robert Collier & Co., Inc.23 it was held that the
federal district attorney was not a necessary party to an action
seeking an injunction, and that such relief could be obtained by
the Commission through its solicitors. In Securities & Exchange
Comm. v. Jones's the defendant was enjoined from violating cer-
tain provisions of the Act, although the information concerning
the defendant's conduct had been obtained by an unlawful inves-
tigation by the Commission. The efforts of the Commission have
generally been directed to the exercise of this more effective and
preventive power in instances of impending or active violations
of the Act, rules, and regulations, rather than to the instigation
of criminal proceedings.
III
The penal and injunctive provisions involve all types of viola-
tions and are therefore as extensive as the statute itself, together
9. Sec. 20 (b).
10. Herlands, op. cit., 624.
11. Securities & Exchange Comm. v. Stock Market Finance, Inc. (D. C.
S. D. N. Y. 1936) 10 F. Supp. 95.
12. (C. C. A. 2, 1937) 87 F. (2d) 446.
13. (C. C. A. 2, 1935) 76 F. (2d) 939.
14. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1936) 15 F. Supp. 321.
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with rules and regulations properly promulgated under its au-
thority by the Securities & Exchange Commission. The nature
and extent of the prohibitions imposed by the Act, therefore, is
all-important.
Section 17 (a) of the Act provides that
It shall be unlawful for any person in the saler6 of any
securities by the use of any means or instruments of trans-
portation or communication in interstate commerce or by
the use of the mails, directly or indirectly
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue
statement of a material fact or any omission to state a mate-
rial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of busi-
ness which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon the purchaser.1 6
By other legislation, Congress has provided that the use of the
mails to promote frauds shall constitute a federal offense.11 In
United States v. Alluan et al.'; the defendants urged that section
17 (a) embraced the provisions in the fraudulent use of the mails
statute, and therefore, repealed that enactment by implication.
The court rejected this argument and sustained a conviction of
violation of both section 17(a) and the fraudulent use of the
mails statute.
The fraudulent use of the mails was a completed offense
before any securities were floated, or any securities were
sold. The violation of the Securities Act was not completed
until the sale actually took place. The two statutes, there-
fore, operate upon different portions of the same act, or the
same fraud; the first for the punishment of the fraud itself,
and the second for the sale of the fruit of the fraud. The
first is complete without a sale; the second requires it. And
15. The type of "sale" required for a violation of this section is defined
by section 2(3) of the Act to be "every contract of sale or disposition of,
attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security
or interest in a security for value."
16. This section imposes a prohibition and safeguard beyond the primary
purpose of the Act, namely, to compel an issuer of new stocks or bonds to
fully and fairly disclose sufficient facts concerning the enterprise so as to
enable the prospective investor to form an independent judgment as to its
merits and desirability as an investment.
17. (1909) 35 Stat. 1130 (1927) 18 U. S. C. A. see. 338.
18. (D. C. N. D. Texas, 1936) 13 F. Supp. 289. The case involved an
open fraud of selling stocks in a prospective gold mine. In fact the whole
scheme was a notorious swindle.
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that is true though "sale" includes some transactions not
ordinarily understood as sales.-
Section 17(a) is directed not only to transactions of an inter-
state character, but to any use of the mails in violation of its
provisions. This latter feature has been held constitutional on
the basis that the mails are under national control and therefore
Congress has the power to forbid their use for deceptive trans-
actions.20
In Coplin v. United States21 the defendants were indicted and
convicted of using the mails to defraud, as well as for violating
section 17(a) of the Act. The scheme employed was that com-
monly known as the "boiler room method of selling." The pros-
pective "sucker" was called by telephone and urged to purchase
certain listed securities on the representation that they were go-
ing up in value. He purchased these listed securities, and their
value went up, due to exchange manipulations by the defendants.
Using this rise of value as a means of gaining the customer's
confidence, the defendants called back, and induced him to "sell
the listed securities and switch" to another unlisted stock which
was speculative and worthless. The court held that the defen-
dants' omission to state that the market rise was due to their
own market manipulations was misleading, and that such "half-
truths" operated as a fraud and deceit on the purchasers in vio-
lation of the Act. It was further ruled that a telephone conversa-
tion constituted a "communication" within the meaning of the
Act.
In Seeman v. United States22 the defendants were convicted
under section 17(a) (3) for shipping forged imitations of genu-
ine bonds to purchasers, pursuant to a purported sale of valid
bonds. Although the conviction was reversed because of prejudi-
cial remarks to the jury, the court held that the section applied
to such forged bonds and was not intended to prohibit only the
fraudulent sale of genuine securities.
One case involved such an open and notorious instance of sell-
ing "watered stock" that the prosecution was brought directly
under the more severe statute prohibiting the use of the mails
to defraud, without regard to section 17 (a) .23
19. Supra, at 292. Thus if A in Missouri sends stock to a confederate
in Illinois pursuant to a plan to defraud, this act would constitute a viola-
tion of the fraudulent use of the mails statute, but not a violation of this
section, since there has been no "sale" of these securities.
20. United States v. Bogy et al. (D. C. W. D. Tenn. 1936) 16 F. Supp.
407, where the defendants sent letters to prospective purchasers requesting
them to buy fraudulently represented and worthless securities.
21. (C. C. A. 9, 1937) 88 F. (2d) 652.
22. (C. C. A. 5, 1937) 90 F. (2d) 88.
23. United States v. Rollnick (C. C. A. 2, 1937) 91 F. (2d) 911.
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In Securities & Exchange Comm. v. Torr24 the defendants were
enjoined from selling and representing securities as a good in-
vestment because the defendants failed to inform the purchasers
that they were receiving compensation for the sale. The court
held that such action led the purchasers to believe that the de-
fendants were disinterested and were giving impartial informa-
tion as to the worth of the security. This action was held to
constitute a failure to state a material fact which in turn created
a misleading general impression. The fact that the purchaser
had obtained full value for his money was held to be immaterial,
since section 17(a) makes no mention of pecuniary loss to the
public and persons may be deceived and yet suffer no financial
loss.
In another case the court held that the offer of the defendant
of 4,918 shares of stock "at the market price" could refer only
to stock exchange quotations, and that this implied "a price
standard which normally reflects the operation of a free and
open market in the sale and purchase of securities. ' 2 The failure
of the defendant to inform its customers that the defendant's
vendor had agreed to withhold 17,000 of 60,000 outstanding
shares from the market while the defendant was disposing of
its shares constituted an omission of a material fact and conse-
quently was enjoinable as a violation of section 17(a) (2).
Additional instances in which injunctions have been granted
for acts which were held to constitute a violation of section
17(a) are the following: a representation that a gold mine was
a "proved mine" and that it contained "unlimited gold ore," when
in fact it had never been run at a profit ;23 a representation that
300,000 bottles of Q-623 had been sold, when only a few thou-
sand bottles had actually been sold ;27 a circular which stated "that
there is only a small block of stock of defendant corporation
available," when in fact, the entire stock was still available ;28
a report that a semi-annual dividend of 6% would be paid on
the class "A" stock in December of 1936, whereas in truth and
fact, the defendant corporation had no earnings from which a
dividend could be paid and no reason to anticipate that any such
24. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1936) 15 F. Supp. 144.
25. Securities and Exchange Comm. v. Otis & Co. (D. C. N. D. Ohio
1936) 18 F. Supp. 100.
26. Securities & Exchange Comm. v. McDowell Mines, Inc., et al. (D. C.
D. Colo. 1937) C. C. H., Securities Act, 654, par. 4761 (.11).
27. Securities & Exchange Comm. v. Associated Pharmacists of Balti-
more, Inc., et al. (D. C. D. Md. 1937) C. C. H., Securities Act, 655, par.
4761 (.12).
28. Supra, at 655, par. 4761 (.13).
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earnings would be available for dividend payments by December,
1936 ;29 an untrue representation that the corporation whose se-
curities were being sold was and had been operating at a profit ;30
a failure to state to purchasers that dividends paid on securities
had not been paid from the profits and earnings of the corpora-
tion, and had been paid from the capital funds of the corporation
issuing such securities ;31 a representation that the securities be-
ing sold were treasury-owned securities of the corporation issu-
ing them, when such securities were not in fact treasury-owned
securities of such corporation ;32 an exaggerated statement as to
the number and nature of the defendant's oil and gas wells.33
Section 17 (a) applies to those securities which are otherwise
exempt from the operation of the Act under section 3.34 Section
17(b) provides that
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of any
means or instrument of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, to pub-
lish, give publicity to, or circulate any notice, circular, ad-
vertisement, newspaper, article, letter, investment service,
or communication which, though not purporting to offer a
security for sale, describes such security for a consideration
received or to be received, directly or indirectly, from an
issuer, underwriter, or dealer, without fully disclosing the
receipt, whether past or prospective, or such consideration
and the amount thereof.
This provision was primarily designed to meet the evils of
"tipster sheets" and articles in newspapers and periodicals which
purport to give unbiased opinions although in reality such opin-
ions have been purchased.35 In interpreting this section the Com-
mission has ruled that when a statistical service company pub-
lishes ratings for securities and advice as to their purchase, sale
or retention even though it receives from the issuing company
only a fiat, non-contingent fee, such compensation must be dis-
closed although it is an ordinary expectation of profit.38 This
provision also applies to such securities as are exempt from the
Act under section 3.37
29. Supra, at 655, par. 4761 (.14).
30. Securities & Exchange Comm. v. The Krystal Chemical Co. Inc. (D.
C. D. C. 1937) C. C. H., Securities Act, 657, par. 4761 (.16).
31. Supra, at 657, par. 4761 (.19).
32. Supra, at 657, par. 4761 (.20).
33. Securities & Exchange Comm. v. Hertz & Co. Inc. (D. C. D. C. 1937)
C. C. H., Securities Act, 655, par. 4761 (.15).
34. Sec. 17 (c).
35. See H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
36. (1933) Securities Act Release No. 97.
37. Sec. 17 (c).
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The following prohibition is imposed by section 5.
(a) Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a se-
curity, it shall be unlawful for any person, directly or in-
directly
(1) to make use of any means or instruments of trans-
portation or communication in interstate commerce or of
the mails to sell or offer to buy such security through the
use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise; or(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or
in interstate commerce, by any means or instruments of
transportation, any such security for the purpose of sale
or security or for delivery after sale.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly
(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transpor-
tation or communication in interstate commerce or of the
mails to carry or transport any prospectus relating to any
security registered under the title, unless such prospectus
meets the requirements of section 10.
The power of Congress to exclude such securities from the
mails unless a true statement describing them has been filed with
the Commission was declared constitutional as a reasonable
method of preventing the use of the mails to promote and con-
summate sales of misrepresented securities.88 In Re Matter of
Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corporation9 most clearly illus-
trates the extensive control by the Commission over the sale of
securities under this section. A purchaser who authorized his
broker to deliver to him through the mails bonds purchased for
him was held to have indirectly caused the bonds to be carried
through the mails for the purpose of delivery after sale in viola-
tion of section 5 (a). The Commission also ruled that in a sale
to a brokerage house a seller is chargeable with knowledge that
he may be selling to an agent and that the agent may use means
or instruments of transportation for the purpose of delivery to
the purchaser; and that the seller may thus be held to have in-
directly caused such delivery in violation of section 5 (a) (2).
And in its final and most drastic ruling the Commission denied
a temporary registration on the Securities Exchange to any se-
curity neither registered nor exempt from registration under the
Act. The following reason was advanced to sustain this action:
* * * because of the ultimate and unbroken relationship or
transaction on such exchange to the interstate "flow" of
38. Jones v. Securities & Exchange Comm. (C. C. A. 2, 1935) 79 F. (2d)
617.
39. (1935) Securities Act Release No. 260.
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securities through such exchange, it is in itself to be re-
garded as a means or instrument of communication or trans-
portation in interstate commerce.
In preparing literature to be circulated among prospective
clientele prior to the effective date of the statement applied for,
the General Counsel of the Commission has declared that such
literature may be distributed, providing it does not constitute
"selling literature. ' 4° This latter type of circulation, of course,
must be preceded or accompanied by a prospectus meeting the
requirements of the Act. The following suggestions were ad-
vanced by the General Counsel of the Commission as prerequisites
to proper, advance literature: (1) it must contain no recommen-
dations or opinions upon the security; (2) it must present a fair
summarization of the salient information contained in the regis-
tration statement; and (3) it must not constitute an offer or in-
ducement to purchase or sell the security.41
In another opinion by the General Counsel of the Commission,
it was held that the party who sends "selling literature" need
not be the one who sent the prospectus ahead to the purchaser,
it being sufficient that such prospectus was in fact received. Such
literature, however, must conform to the prospectus, and the
party sending it assumes this risk both civilly and criminally.42
The provisions of section 5 (a) and 5 (b) do not apply to the
sale of any security if the issue of which it is a part is sold
only to persons resident within a single state or territory, or if
the issuer of such securities is a person resident and doing busi-
ness within or, if a corporation, is incorporated by and doing
business within such state or territory.43
Section 23 of the Act imposes this prohibition.
Neither the fact that the registration statement for a se-
curity has been filed or is in effect, nor the fact that a stop
order is not in effect with respect thereto shall be deemed a
finding by the Commission that the registration statement
is true and accurate on its face or that it does not contain
an untrue statement of fact or omit to state a material fact,
or be held to mean that the Commission has in any way
passed upon the merits, or given approval to, such security.
40. (1935) Securities Act Release No. 464; (1936) Securities Act Re-
lease No. 802.
41. Ibid.
42. (1936) Securities Act Release No. 828.
43. Sec. 5 (c). For some of the problems which may arise under this
exemption and their suggested solution see Throop and Lane, Some Prob-
lems Of Exemption Under The Securities Act Of 1933 (1937) Law and
Contemporary Problems, 87, 107-109.
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It shall be unlawful to make, or cause to be made, to any
prospective purchaser any representation contrary to the
foregoing provisions of the section. (Italics supplied.)
The affixing of any signature to a registration statement with-
out the authority of the purported signer constitutes a violation
of the Act.4"
IV
For purposes of investigation the Securities & Exchange Com-
mission and its agents are empowered to administer oaths and
affirmations, subpoena witnesses, take evidence, and require the
production of any books, papers, or other documents which are
deemed relevant or material to the inquiry.45 In case of con-
tumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued by the Commission,
any United States court, within the jurisdiction of which the
subpoened person is found or resides, may upon application by
the Commission issue to such person an order requiring him to
appear before the Commission and to produce the evidence de-
manded. Any failure to obey such an order of the court may be
punished by the court as a contempt thereof. 0 This extensive
investigatory power granted to the Commission is one of the
most commendable features of the Act. The section, however,
has been criticized for its failure to contain a like provision which
would enable the Attorney General to compel a witness to testify
before the grand jury. It is pointed out that although a majority
of the investigations will probably originate with the Commis-
sion, after the case has been turned over to the Attorney General
it will probably be necessary or desirable for him in the course
of his further investigation, or in connection with the prepara-
tion for trial, to examine additional witnesses before the grand
jury.4 7
The Act further provides that no person shall be excused from
attending and testifying or from producing evidence before the
Commission, or in obedience to the subpoena of the Commission,
or in any cause or proceeding instituted by the Commission on
the ground that the testimony or evidence may tend to incrimi-
nate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture. It is further
provided that no individual shall be prosecuted or subjected to
any penalty or forfeiture on account of any transaction concern-
ing which he is compelled, after having claimed his privilege
44. Sec. 6 (a).
45. Sec. 19 (b). See Note (1935) 44 Yale L. J. 819 for an extended dis-
cussion of the Commission's inquisitorial powers.
46. See. 22 (b).
47. Herlands, supra, note 1, at 625.
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against self-incrimination, to testify or produce such evidence,
except that the individual so testifying shall not be exempt from
prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testify-
ing.48
In McMann v. Securities & Exchange Comm.49 the court held
that a customer was not entitled to prevent his broker from com-
plying with subpoenas issued by the Commission to produce
copies of the customer's account. The court rejected the conten-
tion that such subpoenas infringed the customer's immunity from
unreasonable searches. The evidence showed that the Commis-
sion's motive was a lawful investigation limited to transactions
as to which the Commission had evidence of violations of the
statute and was not merely a "fishing excursion." The search,
therefore, was not "unreasonable," as being out of proportion
to the end sought.
The Act does not expressly provide for the criminal liability
of officers, directors, accountants and other persons coming in
contact with the promotion, underwriting, issuance, and distri-
bution of a particular security. Such parties, however, can be
prosecuted effectively under general criminal provisions which
makes anyone aiding, abetting, counseling, inducing, or procur-
ing the commission of a crime guilty as a principal.50
The Act provides that any condition, stipulation, or provision
binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance
with any provision of the Act or of the rules and regulations shall
be void.51
V
It is apparent that the few criminal convictions to date have
been for violations of a most flagrant, dishonest, and conniving
nature. Those violations which have been enjoined, however,
although detrimental to the investors, were not primarily a
scheme to cheat or defraud him. This latter type of violation is
equally subject to criminal liability, although the element of
"wilfullness" would probably be more difficult to prove. It is
submitted, however, that the Commission seems to have indicated
a policy not to invoke penal liability except in flagrant instances
of violation.
Thus viewed, the penal and injunctive provisions of this com-
plicated Act are for the most part clear and unambiguous. The
decisions interpreting these sections have added little difficulty.
48. Sec. 22 (c).
49. (C. C. A. 2, 1937) 87 F. (2d) 377.
50. (1909) 35 Stat. 1152 (1927) 18 U. S. C. A. sec. 550.
51. Sec. 14.
NOTES19381
Washington University Open Scholarship
262 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 23
The future, of course, will bring new problems and unexpected
complications. It is believed, however, that if the purposes of
these carefully drafted penal and injunctive provisions are borne
in mind, and subtle, exculpatory distinctions are not permitted
to develop, these vital problems under the Act will remain rela-
tively simple.
MoRRIs JACK GARDEN.
RADIO DEFAMATION -LIBEL OR SLANDER?
Homines qui gestant, quique auseultant crimina,
Si meo arbitratu liceat, omnes pendeant,
Gestores linguis, auditores auribus.1
Plautus Pseudolus I. 5. 12
I
A survey of the modern law of libel and slander will expose
the scars wrought by time in the visage of defamation. The
sixteenth and early seventeeth centuries witnessed the develop-
ment of slander as a tort through the action on the case.2 Juris-
tic attempts to discourage the action on the case, however, re-
sulted in certain defects in the law of slander. In order to remedy
these defects, judicial fecundity produced the law of libel in the
latter part of the seventeenth century.3 The cases, as they arose,
were decided not on general or theoretical grounds, but rather
for reasons which seemed most expedient and sufficient to the
judges at the time to dispose of the particular case in hand. 4
In their development libel and slander were not scientifically
cultivated. Theirs was a haphazard growth influenced by the
events of each century, such as the widespread employment of
printing. Important political developments of the eighteenth
century resulted in a somewhat clear-cut division of the tort of
defamation into libel and slander. This division has formed a
good starting point for the development of, and a satisfactory
framework for, the many detailed rules made necessary by the
nineteenth century methods of communications.2
The twentieth century is witnessing the development of a new
1. Your tittle tattlers, and those who listen to slander, by my good will
should all be hanged-the former by their tongues, the latter by their ears.
2. 8 Holdsworth, History of English Law (1926) 367.
3. Ibid.
4. 8 Holdsworth, History of English Law (1926) 362.
5. 8 Holdsworth, History of English Law (1926) 378.
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